G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.

This is an analysis of the relation of green to nineteenth century thought. The author believes that green stands for three ideas. First, He is the major nineteenth century critic of utilitarianism. Second, He is the main critic of laissez-Faire individualism. Third, He is the major critic of empiricism. Green believed that experience is identical with thought; the real world is the intelligible world. The human mind, In knowing, Establishes relations with the eternal mind. The author concludes that green is (...) both a platonist and an augustinian, Eliminating particulars, Or feelings, From philosophical importance. (staff). (shrink)

This is an analysis of the relation of green to nineteenth century thought. the author believes that green stands for three ideas. first, he is the major nineteenth century critic of utilitarianism. second, he is the main critic of laissez-faire individualism. third, he is the major critic of empiricism. green believed that experience is identical with thought; the real world is the intelligible world. the human mind, in knowing, establishes relations with the eternal mind. the author concludes that green is (...) both a platonist and an augustinian, eliminating particulars, or feelings, from philosophical importance. (staff). (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Biblical anthropology is demonstrably both holist and dualist. It is holist in teaching that God created, redeems, and will glorify humans as whole embodied persons. It is dualist in teaching that God created humans of two ingredients and that he sustains persons apart from their bodies between death and resurrection. This chapter shows that key arguments against dualism are compromised by problematic hermeneutics, conceptual confusions, and faulty reasoning. It also shows that monism cannot account for the texts which imply dualism, (...) and that dualism is compatible with holism. N. T. Wright corroborates the exegesis supporting these conclusions but defines and rejects dualism as incompatible with holism. Nevertheless, his understanding of holism is compatible with virtually all current Christian dualism. However, Joel Green's holistic exegesis, integral anthropology, and practical theology make valuable contributions that dualists can affirm. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:F. H. Bradley and the Working-out of Absolute Idealism* JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. FRANCIS HERBERTBRADLEY (1846-1924) 1 agreed with the other English idealists that the real world is the experienced world. But he started with the fundamental conviction that "experience" is more than "thought," as Green had maintained. Bradley's basic drive is the refusal to abolish "feeling" in favor of knowledge and intelligibility. "Feeling" is a fundamental and (...) ineradicable aspect of "reality"m more fundamental, in fact, than thinking. In the immediately experienced world, all intelligible distinctions and relations are merged in a "whole of feeling" which is the ultimate subject-matter of philosophy. "Thought" arises out of feeling, out of "immediacy," as an interpretation of immediate experience by distinguishing relations and aspects in it. "Knowledge " is only one aspect of the experienced world; it needs blending with "feeling" and will to include all the experienced aspects. "Feeling" starts for Bradley, in his Principles of Logic (1883), in pretty much the empiricist sense, as isolated sensations, and as subjective (in flavor at least). It then becomes neutral: "feeling" is identified with "the felt"; and it grows richer, attempting to include the whole wealth of immediate experience. Thus Bradley gets very close to Dewey's conception of "direct experience," "non-reflective experience," without, however, Dewey's biological analysis. It is through this conception of experience that Bradley approaches the naturalism to which his thinking almost arrived at the end. Thought, that is, has a setting in experience " it is relational, and by its analysis it breaks up experienced and felt wholes. There is a double insistence in Bradley. On the one hand, reality is experienced, but is not adequately expressed in thought. On the other, reality/s accessible to knowledge. What has often been called Bradley's "skepticism" is really an objective relativism. Thought, logical structure, is not ultimate. In Appearance and *This study of F. It. Bradley is based on one of five chapters on post-ttegehan philosophical Ideahsm in Britain and America to be included in my forthcoming Career oJ Philosophy in Modem Times, Vol.III: The Hundred Years Since Darwin. ISee Bradley ed. of Mind, XXXIV (1925); A. E. Taylor, "F. H. Bradley"; J. H. Muirhead, "Bradley's Place in Philosophy." See also T. M. Forsyth, English Philosophy (London: 1910), chap. VII, 2rid part; Rudolf Kagey, F. H. Bradley's Logic (New York: 1931). The best philosophical analyses of Bradley are Robert D. Mack, The Appeal to Immediate Experience (New York: 1945),and Richard Wollheim,F. H. Bradley (Pelican Books, 1959). [245] 246 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Reality, he insists it is really self-contradictory; then later he emphasizes rather that it is always relative to its particular subiect-matter. The real, experienced world is never identical with the intelligible world, yet it is also never "extraneous " to it. The relation of the two can be said to be, in Aristotelian terms, that of substance to form, that of what is to its intelligible aspect. The intelligible world, the system of science and knowledge, thus fundamentally needs criticism in the light of its setting in the experienced world. This is not only the entire drive of Dewey's Experience and Nature; it is the expression of that whole current of thought on the Continent which began with the criticism of Hegel's "panlogism" in the 1840's and is today called "Existentialism." Bradley is the British counterpart of all those who have criticized philosophies of logical structure like T. H. Green's, or like the other contemporary forms of Neo-Kantianism in Germany and France. The "known world" is a world of relations distingflished in the richer "real world." These distinctions are ultimately relative to their particular setting, but in that setting they are valid enough. Bradley's celebrated doctrine of the "degrees of truth and reality" means that practically knowledge is "true"; any idea which fulfills its purpose of rendering some portion or aspect of experience intelligible and significant and meaningful, and which is not ousted by a better idea, Bradley is willing to say is "so far true." It is valid, in its own sphere and purpose, despite its ultimate inconsistency; the wave-theory... (shrink)

Nature seems to be such that we can describe it accurately with quantum theories of bosons and fermions alone, without resort to parastatistics. This has been seen as a deep mystery: paraparticles make perfect physical sense, so why don’t we see them in nature? We consider one potential answer: every paraparticle theory is physically equivalent to some theory of bosons or fermions, making the absence of paraparticles in our theories a matter of convention rather than a mysterious empirical discovery. We (...) argue that this equivalence thesis holds in all physically admissible quantum field theories falling under the domain of the rigorous Doplicher–Haag–Roberts approach to superselection rules. Inadmissible parastatistical theories are ruled out by a locality-inspired principle we call charge recombination. 1 Introduction2 Paraparticles in Quantum Theory3 Theoretical Equivalence3.1 Field systems in algebraic quantum field theory3.2 Equivalence of field systems4 A Brief History of the Equivalence Thesis4.1 The Green decomposition4.2 Klein transformations4.3 The argument of Drühl, Haag, and Roberts4.4 The Doplicher–Roberts reconstruction theorem5 Sharpening the Thesis6 Discussion6.1 Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics6.2 Structuralism and haecceities6.3 Paraquark theories. (shrink)

Major shifts in the field of model theory in the twentieth century have seen the development of new tools, methods, and motivations for mathematicians and philosophers. In this book, John T. Baldwin places the revolution in its historical context from the ancient Greeks to the last century, argues for local rather than global foundations for mathematics, and provides philosophical viewpoints on the importance of modern model theory for both understanding and undertaking mathematical practice. The volume also addresses the impact (...) of model theory on contemporary algebraic geometry, number theory, combinatorics, and differential equations. This comprehensive and detailed book will interest logicians and mathematicians as well as those working on the history and philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Hrushovski originated the study of “flat” stable structures in constructing a new strongly minimal set and a stable 0-categorical pseudoplane. We exhibit a set of axioms which for collections of finite structure with dimension function δ give rise to stable generic models. In addition to the Hrushovski examples, this formalization includes Baldwin's almost strongly minimal non-Desarguesian projective plane and several others. We develop the new case where finite sets may have infinite closures with respect to the dimension function δ. In (...) particular, the generic structure need not be ω-saturated and so the argument for stability is significantly more complicated. We further show that these structures are “flat” and do not interpret a group. (shrink)

This paper examines T. H. Green's and Henry Sidgwick's differing views of desireand the will, and connectedly, their differing views of an individual's good and freedom. It is argued that Sidgwick makes effective criticisms of Green, but that important elements in Green's idealist view of an individual's good and freedom survive the criticism and remain significant today. It is also suggested that Sidgwick's own account of an individual's good is unclear in an important way.

The article examines and extends work bringing together engineering ethics and Science and Technology Studies, which had built upon Diane Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger shuttle accident as a test case. Reconsidering the use of her term “normalization of deviance,” the article argues for a middle path between moralizing against and excusing away engineering practices contributing to engineering disaster. To explore an illustrative pedagogical case and to suggest avenues for constructive research developing this middle path, it examines the emergence of (...) green chemistry and green engineering. Green chemistry began when Paul Anastas and John Warner developed a set of new rules for chemical synthesis that sought to learn from missed opportunities to avoid environmental damage in the twentieth century, an approach that was soon extended to engineering as well. Examination of tacit assumptions about historical counterfactuals in recent, interdisciplinary discussions of green chemistry illuminate competing views about the field’s prospects. An integrated perspective is sought, addressing how both technical practice within chemistry and engineering and the influence of a wider “social movement” can play a role in remedying environmental problems. (shrink)

We give a general account of the goals of axiomatization, introducing a variant on Detlefsen’s notion of ‘complete descriptive axiomatization’. We describe how distinctions between the Greek and modern view of number, magnitude, and proportion impact the interpretation of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry. We argue, as did Hilbert, that Euclid’s propositions concerning polygons, area, and similar triangles are derivable from Hilbert’s first-order axioms. We argue that Hilbert’s axioms including continuity show much more than the geometrical propositions of Euclid’s theorems and (...) thus are an immodest complete descriptive axiomatization of that subject. (shrink)

We explore Shelah's model‐theoretic dividing line methodology. In particular, we discuss how problems in model theory motivated new techniques in model theory, for example classifying theories by their potential (consistently with Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC)) spectrum of cardinals in which there is a universal model. Two other examples are the study (with Malliaris) of the Keisler order leading to a new ZFC result on cardinal invariants and attempts to clarify the “main gap” by reducing the (...) dependence of certain versions on (highly independent) cardinal arithmetic. (shrink)

In this paper we study abstract elementary classes of modules. We give several characterizations of when the class of modules A with is abstract elementary class with respect to the notion that M1 is a strong submodel M2 if the quotient remains in the given class.

This paper explores the possibility that some cases of criminal paternalism might include among their justifying reasons an appeal to human dignity.

We study when classes can have the disjoint amalgamation property for a proper initial segment of cardinals. Theorem A For every natural number k, there is a class $K_k $ defined by a sentence in $L_{\omega 1.\omega } $ that has no models of cardinality greater than $ \supset _{k - 1} $ , but $K_k $ has the disjoint amalgamation property on models of cardinality less than or equal to $\mathfrak{N}_{k - 3} $ and has models of cardinality $\mathfrak{N}_{k (...) - 1} $ . More strongly, we can have disjoint amalgamation up to $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ for α > ω, but have a bound on size of models. Theorem B For every countable ordinal a, there is a class $K_\alpha $ defined by a sentence in $L_{\omega 1.\omega } $ that has no models of cardinality greater than $ \supset _{\omega 1} $ , but K does have the disjoint amalgamation property on models of cardinality less than or equal to $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ . Finally we show that we can extend the $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ to $ \supset _\alpha $ in the second theorem consistently with ZFC and while having $\mathfrak{N}_i \ll \supset _i $ for 0 > i < α. Similar results hold for arbitrary ordinals α with |α|= K and $L_{k + ,\omega } $. (shrink)

A rigorous extension of the full Lorentz group is found which is parameterized by interframe velocities v(t) and which reduces to Special Relativity for acceleration-free cases and to Galilean relativity for low velocity cases. Full group properties are exhibited. Four-momentum is defined and particle masses are shown to be invariants. Four-force is introduced and pseudoforces are shown to enter the equations of particle dynamics. Maxwell's equations are shown to take on pseudocurrent terms in accelerating frames. A four-vector Green function solution (...) to the modified Maxwell equations is presented. Finally, a discussion is offered concerning philosophical questions such as the operational definition of time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whoa! JOHN SHOPTAW ONE A young man with gold hair in a coal-black robe and slippers was off to confront the Sun. But as he paced the hotel corridors, Ray could feel his step losing its jaunt. At this rate, he’d make it to nowhere in nothing flat. Just then, he noticed his old wall map thumbtacked over some double doors. How’d his Boys’ Life get out here? (...) He looked it over, the big fat world, cut open and stretched flat, like an elephant hide. The properties were green, purple and red, and the waters whitish blue. The Mercator-projected bottom was jagged with ice. The whole place was crawling with letters, like ants on a cake. The best part was the creatures: a long-armed squid suctioning a whale, sea lions sunning themselves. No. Seals. He bunched his brows. No. Hills. And game big as states, as nations: hippos in Africa’s watering holes, a beauty of a cheetah, its sights trained. Untacking and folding the map, Ray tucked it into his pocket and slid open the doors. He found himself in a dim cavern facing a motionless escalator. Its stairs were gold-plated, its balustrades brushed aluminum and its handrails hand-rubbed ostrich skin. He could see no end of stairs. It must be arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 one unbroken flight to the Sun’s penthouse. But where was the down escalator? Beats him. He planted his slippers and clasped the rails. With a little lurch the escalator began its quickening glide. Now this was first-class. No huffing required. Simply the assumption of an attitude. Up ahead, the horizon gleamed ivory. 2 whoa! TWO The stairway teeth clamped shut and Ray was thrown into a hard glare. Sunblock and goggles— they’ll let you look into things—on your right, came a voice positively sunny. Ray slathered and goggled himself, and beheld by a high stone robed in emerald moss a trim figure in a sea-snail-purple sweatsuit and a broad-brimmed straw hat puttering about a humid sundial of wide-waking annuals and perennials— snowdrops, crocuses, daisies and daylilies, rice in flower and maize in silk, woozy jasmine and heady grapevines, a temperamental winter daphne, and tall in the motley midst the polar gnomon, an Indian turnsole or heliotrope, sweeping its shaft of shadow from one to the next minute marigold dot as the ambling photosynthesizer passed the fragrant hours of the zodiac. Batting away hummingbirds and honeybees, Ray waded through the flower bed toward Sol. Am I your heir? Can I have what I want? Sure, kid, name it. Ray glanced toward the honey-scented manure. A joyride? Sol sighed. It’s your funeral. Taking his time, he led Ray out to the dayport. What a letdown! Ray’d expected a futuristic heliumpowered sports coupe, or at least a souped-up solar Mustang. Not this gold-rimmed, pyrite-axled backward half-bucket with footpads! John Shoptaw 3 Dawn, meanwhile, with her practiced blush arched her horizon, and her pomegranate interiors yawned wide. The stars dispersed. Venus, her shell-blue and egg-white gauzes aswirl, gave Dawn a last long look above her handmirror’s crescent rim. Sol was watching moonshine evanesce from his glowing barndoors, which cracked in a spewing welding arc and then opened wide to reveal a dozen prompt and close-cropped Hours, coaxing a team of four mammoth pegasi yoked neck and neck and neck and neck, stoked with thick ambrosial plasma and snorting flame. As the nymphs hitched the tack to the chariot pole, the Sun, shaking his head, untied his flaring sunhat and knotted it under Ray’s chin. Lay off the whip and draw rein with a firm hand. They’ll fly by themselves with no help from you. But they’ll answer to Clover, Crocus, Peony, Sage. Steer clear of the straightaway. Bank the rig into a circumbendibus. But don’t, whatever you do... But Ray’s attention had drifted. The rampant quadrupeds hooved trails of sparks down the dayport door, their heavy fog blankets slid off, and they shook out their shoulder-wings. A pliant breeze sprang up from the East... (shrink)

We prove two results on the stability spectrum for Lω1,ω. Here [Formula: see text] denotes an appropriate notion of Stone space of m-types over M. Theorem for unstable case: Suppose that for some positive integer m and for every α μ, K is not i-stable in μ. These results provide a new kind of sufficient condition for the unstable case and shed some light on the spectrum of strictly stable theories in this context. The methods avoid the use of compactness (...) in the theory under study. In this paper, we expound the construction of tree indiscernibles for sentences of Lω1,ω. Further we provide some context for a number of variants on the Ehrenfeucht–Mostowski construction. (shrink)

In Part I of this paper we argued that the first-order systems HP5 and EG are modest complete descriptive axiomatization of most of Euclidean geometry. In this paper we discuss two further modest complete descriptive axiomatizations: Tarksi’s for Cartesian geometry and new systems for adding $$\pi$$. In contrast we find Hilbert’s full second-order system immodest for geometrical purposes but appropriate as a foundation for mathematical analysis.

We provide a general framework for studying the expansion of strongly minimal sets by adding additional relations in the style of Hrushovski. We introduce a notion of separation of quantifiers which is a condition on the class of expansions of finitely generated models for the expanded theory to have a countable ω-saturated model. We apply these results to construct for each sufficiently fast growing finite-to-one function μ from 'primitive extensions' to the natural numbers a theory T μ of an expansion (...) of an algebraically closed field which has Morley rank 2. Finally, we show that if μ is not finite-to-one the theory may not be ω-stable. (shrink)

We introduce the notion T does not omit obstructions. If a stable theory does not admit obstructions then it does not have the finite cover property (nfcp). For any theory T, form a new theory by adding a new unary function symbol and axioms asserting it is an automorphism. The main result of the paper asserts the following: If T is a stable theory, T does not admit obstructions if and only if has a model companion. The proof involves some (...) interesting new consequences of the nfcp. (shrink)

The dissertation defends a teleological liberal normative theory against the most prominent contributions to contemporary liberal thought, specifically the deontological liberalism of John Rawls and those who have followed in the spirit of his work. The teleological theory that is advanced incorporates an objective conception of value; hence, the reference to "ideal" liberalism to designate the position that is defended. ;Ideal teleological theories have had a prominent place in modern liberal thought in the works of T. H. Green, the (...) new liberals, and others , although as a result of the impact of Rawls's work such positions have not recently received much attention and doubts have been raised about their capacity to satisfy liberal commitments to tolerance, anti-paternalism, and liberty. The dissertation defends the liberal credentials of ideal liberalism while arguing it is in a better position to respond to some of the more forceful criticisms of contemporary Rawlsian liberalism. In particular, the dissertation argues that contemporary liberalism's commitment to a resourcist conception of value, or to "liberal neutrality," cannot be sustained against criticisms about the fairness of this account of value to certain non-individualistic ways of life and against criticisms about its capacity to ensure a stable, progressive social environment. These criticisms point to the need to adopt a neo-Aristotelian conception of value as the basis of a liberal normative theory. It is also argued that a liberal theory that is based in such a conception of value is better able than its main competitor to address issues related to justice, gender, and culture. A chapter is also devoted to restoring a traditional liberal commitment to liberty as a predominant value in liberal theory by defending a normative conception of liberty in response to contemporary liberal skepticism that there is an important role for liberty in normative moral or political theory. Although the dissertation is not an exercise in the history of ideas, it draws importantly on the work of earlier ideal liberals such as J. S. Mill, T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, and J. A. Hobson. (shrink)

The projective plane of Baldwin 695) is model complete in a language with additional constant symbols. The infinite rank bicolored field of Poizat 1339) is not model complete. The finite rank bicolored fields of Baldwin and Holland 371; Notre Dame J. Formal Logic , to appear) are model complete. More generally, the finite rank expansions of a strongly minimal set obtained by adding a ‘random’ unary predicate are almost strongly minimal and model complete provided the strongly minimal set is ‘well-behaved’ (...) and admits ‘exactly rank k formulas’. The last notion is a geometric condition on strongly minimal sets formalized in this paper. (shrink)

CHAPTER 1 Combinatorial Geometries and Infinitary Logics In this chapter we introduce two of the key concepts that are used throughout the text. ...

Studies in the neurobiological underpinnings of social information processing bypsychologists, neurobiologists, psychiatrists, radiologists, and neurologists, using methods thatrange from brain imaging techniques to comparative analyses.

We use κ-free but not Whitehead Abelian groups to constructElementary Classes (AEC) which satisfy the amalgamation property but fail various conditions on the locality of Galois-types. We introduce the notion that an AEC admits intersections. We conclude that for AEC which admit intersections, the amalgamation property can have no positive effect on locality: there is a transformation of AEC's which preserves non-locality but takes any AEC which admits intersections to one with amalgamation. More specifically we have: Theorem 5.3. There is (...) an AEC with amalgamation which is not (N₀, N₁)-tame but is 2(N0, ∞)-tame; Theorem 3.3. It is consistent with ZFC that there is an AEC with amalgamation which is not (≤ N₂, ≤ N₂)-compact. (shrink)

I describe a problem about the relations among symmetries, laws and measurable quantities. I explain why several ways of trying to solve it will not work, and I sketch a solution that might work. I discuss this problem in the context of Newtonian theories, but it also arises for many other physical theories. The problem is that there are two ways of defining the space-time symmetries of a physical theory: as its dynamical symmetries or as its empirical symmetries. The two (...) definitions are not equivalent, yet they pick out the same extension. This coincidence cries out for explanation, and it is not clear what the explanation could be. The Puzzle: Symmetries, Measurability and Invariance 1.1 The symmetries and the measurable quantities of Newtonian mechanics 1.2 The puzzle Two Easy Answers Another Unsuccessful Solution: Appeal to Geometrical Symmetries Locating the Puzzle The Relation between Laws and Measurability A Possible Solution CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Let $\mathbf{I}(\mu,K)$ denote the number of nonisomorphic models of power $\mu$ and $\mathbf{IE}(\mu,K)$ the number of nonmutually embeddable models. We define in this paper the notion of a diverse class and use it to prove a number of results. The major result is Theorem B: For any diverse class $K$ and $\mu$ greater than the cardinality of the language of $K$, $\mathbf{IE}(\mu,K) \geq \min(2^\mu,\beth_2).$ From it we deduce both an old result of Shelah, Theorem C: If $T$ is countable and (...) $\lambda_0 > \aleph_0$ then for every $\mu > \aleph_0,\mathbf{IE}(\mu,T) \geq \min(2^\mu,\beth_2)$, and an extension of that result to uncountable languages, Theorem D: If $|T| < 2^\omega,\lambda_0 > |T|$, and $|D(T)| = |T|$ then for $\mu > |T|$, $\mathbf{IE}(\mu,T) \geq \min(2^\mu,\beth_2).$. (shrink)

$\underline{\text{Saturation is} (\mu, \kappa)-\text{transferable in} T}$ if and only if there is an expansion T 1 of T with ∣ T 1 ∣ = ∣ T ∣ such that if M is a μ-saturated model of T 1 and ∣ M ∣ ≥ κ then the reduct M ∣ L(T) is κ-saturated. We characterize theories which are superstable without f.c.p., or without f.c.p. as, respectively those where saturation is (ℵ 0 , λ)- transferable or (κ (T), λ)-transferable for all λ. (...) Further if for some $\mu \geq \mid T \mid, 2^\mu > \mu^+$ , stability is equivalent to for all μ ≥ ∣ T ∣, saturation is (μ, 2 μ )- transferable. (shrink)

The law-governed world-picture -- A remarkable idea about the way the universe is cosmos and compulsion -- The laws as the cosmic order : the best-system approach -- The three ways : no-laws, non-governing-laws, governing-laws -- Work that laws do in science -- An important difference between the laws of nature and the cosmic order -- The picture in four theses -- The strategy of this book -- The meta-theoretic conception of laws -- The measurability approach to laws -- What (...) comes where -- In defense of some received views -- Some assumptions that will be in play -- The laws are propositions -- The laws are true -- The logically contingent consequences of the laws are laws themselves -- At least some laws are metaphysically contingent -- The meta-theoretic conception of laws -- Laws of nature, laws of science, laws of theories -- The first-order conception versus the meta-theoretic conception -- What is a law of nature? -- Some examples of meta-theoretic accounts -- The virtues of the meta-theoretic conception -- Weighing the virtues and shortcomings of the meta-theoretic conception -- An epistemological argument for the meta-theoretic conception of laws -- The discoverability thesis, the governing thesis, and the first-order conception -- The main argument -- The objection from bad company -- The objection from inference to the best explanation -- The objection from bayesianism -- The objection from contextualist epistemology -- The objection from the threat of inductive skepticism -- Laws, governing, and counterfactuals -- Where we are now -- What would things have to be like in order for the laws of nature to govern the universe? -- Lawhood, inevitability, counterfactuals -- What is it for a proposition to be inevitably true? -- What is it for a whole class of propositions to be inevitably true? -- What is it for lawhood to confer inevitability? -- NP and supporting counterfactuals -- The worry about context-variability -- A solution and a look ahead -- When would the laws have been different? -- Where we are now -- The God cases -- Other counterexamples to NP -- A moral-theoretic counterexample to NP -- Scientific contexts and non-scientific contexts -- Scientific God cases? -- Lewisian non-backtracking counterexamples -- Where things stand now -- How could science show that the laws govern? -- Why the law-governed world-picture must include the science-says-so thesis -- What is extra-scientific? -- How can the science-says-so thesis be true? -- NP as a consequence of the presuppositions in any scientific context -- Np as true in all possible scientific contexts -- But how could it be so? -- Attack of the actual-factualists -- Measurement and counterfactuals -- Where we are now -- Measurements, reliability, counterfactuals -- A general principle that captures the relation between measurement and counterfactuals -- What we can learn about lawhood from what we have learned about the counterfactual commitments of science -- A first-order account of laws or a meta-theoretic account of laws? -- What methods are presupposed to be legitimate measurement procedures? -- Why we must adopt a meta-theoretic account of laws -- What lawhood is -- Where we are now -- The measurability account of laws -- Brief review of the case for the mal -- A note about hedged laws -- How plausible is the mal? -- What if we don't care about the law-governed world-picture? -- Newton's God and Laplace's demon -- Beyond humean and non-humean -- Two views of laws -- Humean supervenience and the meta-theoretic conception -- Alleged counterexamples to humean supervenience -- Governing and non-trivial necessity -- How the mal lets us have it all -- Humeanism? non-humeanism? -- What is the significance of the idea of the law-governed universe? -- Where in the world are the laws of nature? -- Appendix: The mal in action : a few examples -- Of scientific theories and their laws -- Newton's theory as a paradigm example -- Classical special-force laws -- Geometrical optics and one of its laws -- Local deterministic field theories. (shrink)

This paper contains portions of Baldwin’s talk at the Set Theory and Model Theory Conference and a detailed proof that in a suitable extension of ZFC, there is a complete sentence of \ that has maximal models in cardinals cofinal in the first measurable cardinal and, of course, never again.